THE OPTIMAL INFLATION RATE REVISITED by Acocella, Nicola et al.
 Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Roma (RM) 
T (+39) 06 49766433  F (+39) 06 4957606 
www.memotef.uniroma1.it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE OPTIMAL INFLATION RATE  
REVISITED 
 
 
N. Acocella, G. Di Bartolomeo,  
P. Tirelli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper n° 76 
  Novembre 2010 
The optimal ination rate revisited
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
Università di Teramo
gdibartolomeo@unite.it
Patrizio Tirelli
Università di Milano Bicocca
patrizio.tirelli@unimib.it
Nicola Acocella
Università La Sapienza di Roma
nicola.acocella@uniroma1.it
March, 2011
Abstract
We challenge the widely held belief that New Keynesian models can-
not predict an optimal positive ination rate. In fact we nd that even for
the US economy, characterized by relatively small government size, opti-
mal trend ination is justied by the Phelps argument that the ination
tax should be part of an optimal (distortionary) taxation scheme. This
mainly happens because, unlike standard calibrations of public expendi-
tures that focus on public consumption-to-GDP ratios, we also consider
the diverse, highly distortionary e¤ect of public transfers to households.
Our prediction of the optimal ination rate is broadly consistent with re-
cent estimates of the Fed ination target. We also contradict the view
that the Ramsey-optimal policy should minimize ination volatility over
the business cycle and induce near-random walk dynamics of public debt
in the long run. In fact optimal scal and monetary policies should sta-
bilize long-run debt-to-GDP ratios in order to limit tax (and ination)
distortions in steady state. This latter result is strikingly similar to pol-
icy analyses in the aftermath of the 2008 nancial crisis
Jel codes: E52, E58, J51, E24.
Keywords: trend ination, monetary and scal policy, Ramsey plan.
1 Introduction.
Optimal monetary policy analyses (Khan et al., 2003; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
SGU henceforth, 2004a) identify two key frictions driving the optimal level of
long-run (or trend) ination. The rst one is the adjustment cost of goods
prices, which invariably drives the optimal ination rate to zero. The second
The authors acknowledge nancial support by MIUR (PRIN).
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one are monetary transaction costs that arise unless the central bank imple-
ments the Friedman rule, i.e. a negative steady-state ination rate as long as
the steady-state real interest rate is positive. Phelps (1973) conjectured that
to alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation it might be optimal for gov-
ernments to resort to monetary nancing, driving a wedge between the private
and the social cost of money. SGU (2004a), who allow for an exogenous amount
of public consumption, show that the optimal ination rate lies between zero
and the Friedman rule even accounting for the Phelpse¤ect. This conclusion
is marginally revised, i.e. the optimal ination rate is 0:2%, if the government
budget accounts for public transfers (SGU, 2006). A consensus therefore seems
to exist that monetary transactions costs are relatively low at zero ination, and
that stable prices are the proper policy target. In their survey of the literature,
SGU (2010) argue that the optimality of zero ination is robust to other fric-
tions, such as nominal wage adjustment costs, downward wage rigidity, hedonic
prices, incompleteness of the tax system, the zero bound on the nominal interest
rate.
This theoretical result is in sharp contrast with empirical evidence. For
instance, both in the US and in the Euro area, average ination rates over the
1970-1999 period have been close to 5%. Further, even the widespread central
bank practice of adopting ination targets between 2% and 4% is apparently at
odds with theories of the optimal ination rate (SGU, 2010).
In the paper we reconsider the issue, showing that dismissal of the Phelpsef-
fect is due to an unrealistic parameterization for public expenditures and overall
taxation. In the literature, standard calibrations of public expenditures focus on
public consumption-to-GDP ratios, typically set at 20% (SGU, 2004a; Aruoba
and Schorfeide, 2009). This follows a long-standing tradition in business cy-
cle models, where only public consumption decisions have real e¤ects. In our
framework this choice is not correct, because the focus here is on distortionary
nancing of public expenditures in steady state, where also other components
of public expenditure matter. As a matter of fact, public consumption accounts
for a limited component of the overall public expenditures in OECD countries
(Table 1).
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Table 1 Government expenditures and revenues (1998-2008)*
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Australia 18,00 16,97 36,26 Japan 17,07 21,28 31,81
Austria 19,10 32,29 49,71 Netherlands 23,57 22,19 45,34
Belgium 22,13 27,82 49,39 New Zealand 17,97 20,89 42,01
Canada 19,49 21,56 42,08 Norway 20,76 23,54 56,63
Czech Republic 21,24 22,81 40,12 Poland 17,95 25,34 39,20
Denmark 25,84 27,88 55,96 Portugal 19,57 25,48 41,59
Finland 21,75 27,74 53,12 Slovak Republic 20,24 21,35 36,55
France 23,39 29,21 49,90 Spain 17,75 21,52 38,67
Germany 18,96 27,58 44,61 Sweden 26,67 29,03 57,21
Greece 16,52 28,32 40,19 Switzerland 11,4 23,48 34,40
Hungary 21,98 27,42 43,20 United Kingdom 19,83 22,28 40,38
Ireland 15,11 19,40 44,16 United States 15,26 20,51 33,47
Italy 19,10 28,94 45,25 Euro area 20,17 27,11 45,39
(1) public consumption; (2) other public expenditures; (3) total revenues
* ratios to GDP Source OECD
Even if a proportion of total expenditures goes into production subsidies, it is
apparent that distortionary taxation substantially exceeds public consumption,
in order to nance redistributive policies. For instance in the US, according
to the National Accounts (NIPA) data, in the 1998-2008 period government
transfer payments and government purchases respectively were close to 12%
and 20% of GDP. Hyunseung and Reis (2011) document that between 2008 and
2009 three quarters of the US huge scal stimulus in response to the nancial
crisis were due to increases in transfers.
We show that just allowing for a plausible parameterization of public trans-
fers to households in the SGU (2004a) model reverses their conclusion about
the optimal ination rate, which now monotonically increases from 2% to 12%
as the transfers-to-GDP ratio goes from 10% to 20%. We also nd that an iden-
tical increase in the public-consumption-to-GDP ratio would have a negligible
impact on the optimal ination rate. So, what is special about public transfers?
To grasp the intuition behind our result, assume that lump-sum taxes can be
used to nance expenditures. In the case of public transfers the overall e¤ect
on the household budget constraint is nil, and labor-consumption decisions are
unchanged. By contrast, an increase in public consumption generates a negative
wealth e¤ect that raises the labor supply. If lump sum taxes are not available,
the di¤erent wealth e¤ect explains why nancing transfers requires higher tax
rates than nancing an identical amount of public consumption. Since the in-
centive to monetary nancing is increasing in the amount of tax distortions,
this also explains why the optimal nancing mix requires stronger reliance on
ination when we take transfers into account. Our result is robust to the inclu-
sion of nominal wage rigidity, and is strengthened when we allow for a moderate
degree of price and wage indexation (20%).
We then extend the model by introducing consumption scale e¤ects in the
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monetary transactions technology, in line with existing theoretical models (Bau-
mol, 1952; Khan et al., 2003) and with empirical evidence (Attanasio et al.,
2002). We nd that such consumption scale e¤ects unambiguously contribute
to raise the optimal ination rate. The intuition behind this result is simple.
An increase in ination allows a reduction in distortionary taxation but raises
the monetary transactions costs. This latter e¤ect is weakened when the trans-
action cost is inversely related to the amount of consumption, which, in turn,
increases if the tax rate falls.
In contrast with received wisdom on the optimality of zero-ination targets,
several empirical contributions suggest that the Federal Reserve has targeted a
time-varying, positive ination rate (see Cogley and Sbordone, 2008, and the
references therein). As a preliminary attempt to assess the empirical relevance of
our results, we calibrate the model to the US economy in order to benchmark our
optimal ination rate against Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2008)
estimates of the time-varying ination target implicitly adopted by the Federal
Reserve over the period 1957-2000. We consider di¤erent estimates of nomi-
nal rigidities found in the literature, and nd that in all cases the increase in
the public-transfers-to-GDP ratio observed during the high ination sub-sample
1973-1991 causes an increase in the optimal ination rate which accounts for a
large part of the estimated increase in the Fed target in that period.
Finally, we investigate the optimal scal and monetary policy responses to
shocks. The issue is admittedly not new, but we are able to provide new con-
tributions to the literature. When prices are exible and governments issue
non-contingent nominal debt (Chari et al., 1991) it is optimal to use ination as
a lump-sum tax on nominal wealth, and the highly volatile ination rate allows
to smooth taxes over the business cycle. This result is intuitive in so far as taxes
are distortionary whereas ination volatility is costless. SGU (2004a) show that
when price adjustment is costly optimal ination volatility is in fact minimal
and long-run debt adjustment allows to obtain tax-smoothing over the business
cycle. In this paper the SGU result is reversed when the model is calibrated to
account for a relatively small amount of public transfers (10%). In this case tax
and ination volatility are exploited to limit debt adjustment in the long run.
The interpretation of our result is simple. As discussed above, public transfers
increase the tax burden in steady state. In this case, the accumulation of debt
in the face of an adverse shock which would work as a tax smoothing device
in SGU (2004a)  is less desirable, because it would further increase long-run
distortions. To avoid such distortions, the policymaker is induced to front-load
scal adjustment, and to inate away part of the real value of outstanding
nominal debt. Our results provide theoretical support to policy-oriented analy-
ses which call for a reversal of debt accumulated in the aftermath of the 2008
nancial crisis (Abbas et al., 2010, Blanchard et al. 2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section in-
troduces the model. Section 3 denes the competitive equilibrium. Section 4
illustrates our main results. Section 5 considers the consumption scale e¤ects
on the transaction costs. In section 6 we outline a calibration of our model to
the US economy. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The model.
We consider a simple innite-horizon production economy populated by a con-
tinuum of households and rms whose total measures are normalized to one.
Monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities characterize both product and
labor markets. A demand for money is motivated by assuming that money
facilitates transactions. The government nances an exogenous stream of ex-
penditures by levying distortionary taxes and printing money. Optimal policy
is set according to a Ramsey plan. Right from the outset, it should be noted
that the focus here is on the identication of the optimal nancing mix for ex-
ogenous levels of public expenditures, including consumption and transfers. In
this regard, we closely follow SGU (2004a, 2006, 2010).1
2.1 Households
The representative household (i) maximizes the following utility function
U =
1X
t=0
tu (Ct;i; lt;i) ; u (Ct;i; lt;i) = lnCt;i +  ln (1  lt;i) (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal discount rate, Ct;i =
R 1
0
ct;i(j)
di
 1

is
a consumption bundle, lt;i is a di¤erentiated labor type that is supplied to all
rms. The consumption price index is Pt =
R 1
0
pt(i)

 1 di
  1

.
The ow budget constraint in period t is given by
Ct;i (1 + St;i)+
Mt;i
Pt;i
+
Bt;i
Pt
=
(1   t)wt;ilt;i
Pt
+
Mt 1;i
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
+
Rt 1Bt 1;i
Pt
(2)
where wt;i is the nominal wage;  t is the labor income tax rate; Tt denotes scal
transfers; t are rms prots; Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Bt;i is a
nominally riskless bond that pays one unit of currency in period t + 1. Mt;i
denes nominal money holdings to be used in period t+ 1 in order to facilitate
consumption purchases.
Consumption purchases are subject to a transaction cost
St;i = s(vt;i); s
0(vt;i) > 0 (3)
where vt;i =
Pt;iCt;i
Mt;i
is the households consumption-based money velocity. The
features of s(vt;i) are such that a satiation level of money velocity (v > 0)
exists where the transaction cost vanishes and, simultaneously, a nite demand
for money is associated to a zero nominal interest rate. Following SGU (2004a)
the transaction cost is parameterized as
s(vt;i) = Avt;i +
B
vt;i
  2
p
AB (4)
1For a discussion of the role played by scal transfers in business cycle models see Hyun-
seung and Reis (2011) and the references cited therein.
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The rst-order conditions of the households maximization problem are:2
ct(j) = Ct

pt(j)
Pt
 1
 1
(5)
t =
uc (Ct; lt)
1 + s(vt) + vts0(vt)
(6)
t
t+1
= Rt
Pt
Pt+1
(7)
Rt   1
Rt
= s0(vt)v2t (8)
Equation (5) is the demand for the good j. As in SGU (2004a) condition (6)
states that the transaction cost introduces a wedge between the marginal utility
of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth that vanishes only if v = v.
Equation (7) is a standard Euler condition. Equation (8) implicitly denes the
households money demand function.
2.2 Firmspricing decisions
Each rm (j) produces a di¤erentiated good using the production function:3
yt(j) = ztlt;j ; (9)
where zt denotes a productivity shock4 and lt;j is a standard labor bundle:
lt;j =
Z 1
0
lt;j(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
(10)
Firm (j) demand for labor type (i) is
lt;j (i) =

wt;i
Wt
 
lt;j (11)
where Wt =
Z 1
0
w1 t;i di
 1
1 
is the wage index.
We assume a sticky price specication based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic
cost of nominal price adjustment:
2When solving its optimization problem, the household takes as given goods and bond
prices. As usual, we also assume that the household is subject to a solvency constraint that
prevents him from engaging in Ponzi schemes.
3We abstract from capital accumulation and assume constant returns to scale of employed
labor. The consequences of these two assumptions are discussed in SGU (2006) and SGU
(2010) respectively. Our results are not a¤ected by the introduction of diminishing returns to
scale for labor (simulation results available upon request).
4We assume that ln zt follows an AR(1) process.
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p
2

Pt(j)=Pt 1(j)
t 1
  1
2
(12)
where p > 0 is a measure of price stickiness and t = Pt=Pt 1 denotes the gross
ination rate and  2 [0; 1] is the degree of price indexation to past ination.
In a symmetrical equilibrium the price adjustment rule satises:
ztlt ( mct)
1   + p
t

p
t 1
 
t

p
t 1
  1
!
= Et
t+1
t
p
"
t+1

p
t
 
t+1

p
t
  1
!#
(13)
where
mct =
1
azt
Wt
Pt
From (5) it would be straightforward to show that 1 = 
p denes the price
markup that obtains under exible prices.
2.3 Wage-setting decisions
The labour market is also characterized by monopolistic competition and rigid
nominal wages. Under exible wages
Wt
Pt
= w
t
ul (Ct; lt)
uc (Ct; lt)
(14)
where w =  (   1) 1 denotes the gross wage markup and 
t = 1+s(vt)+vts
0(vt)
1 t
denotes the policy wedge, which depends on both tax and ination decisions.
We model nominal wage stickiness as in Rotemberg (1982). Each household
maximizes the expected value of equation (1) subject to (2), (11) and to
w
2
 
Wt(j)=Wt 1(j)
wt 1
  1
!2
(15)
where w > 0 is a measure of wage stickiness and w 2 [0; 1] is the degree of
wage indexation to past ination.
As a result, in a symmetrical equilibrium, the wage adjustment rule satises:
(1   t) Wt
Pt
+
wul (Ct; lt) (1 + s(vt) + vts
0(vt))
uc (Ct; lt)

lt
w   1+
+ w
"
!t
wt 1
 
!t
wt 1
  1
!#
= Et
t+1
t
w

!t+1
wt

!t+1
wt
  1

(16)
where !t = WtWt 1 .
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2.4 The government
As in SGU (2006), the government supplies an exogenous, stochastic and un-
productive amount of public good Gt and implements exogenous transfers Tt. 5
Government nancing is obtained through a labor-income tax, money creation
and issuance of one-period, nominally risk free bonds. The governments ow
budget constraint is then given by 6
Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+Gt + Tt =  t
Wt
Pt
lt +
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
(17)
3 The competitive equilibrium.
The competitive equilibrium is a set of plans fCt; lt; t;mct; t; vtg+1t=0 that,
given the policies fRt;  tg+1t=0 , the exogenous processes fzt; gtg+1t=0 , and the ini-
tial conditions, satises (6), (7), (8), (13), (16), (17) and the aggregate resource
constraint
Yt = Ct (1 + St) +Gt +
p
2

t
t 1
  1
2
+
w
2
 
wt
wt 1wt 1
  1
!2
(18)
4 Ramsey policy.
The Ramsey policy is a set of plans fRt;  tg+1t=0 that maximizes the expected
value of (1) subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (6), (7), (8), (13),
(16), (17), (18) and the exogenous stochastic process driving the scal and
technology shocks. Solution requires numerical simulations.7
4.1 The role of public expenditure variables
The rst step in our analysis is to replicate the simulation exercise in SGU
(2004a) with the addition that 0 < T=Y < 20%. Therefore, in this calibration
the labour market is perfectly competitive, w = 1; the nominal wage is exible,
w = 0, and there is no indexation  = w = 0. The time unit is meant to be a
year; we set the subjective discount rate  to 0:96 to be consistent with a steady-
state real rate of return of 4 percent per year; transaction cost parameters A and
B are set at 0:011 and 0:075; we assume the debt-to-GDP ratio is 0:44 percent;
in the goods market monopolistic competition implies a gross markup of 1:2;
and the annualized Rotemberg price adjustment cost is 4:375. The preference
5Note that the focus of the paper is the identication of the optimal nancing mix, where
optimality is driven by e¢ ciency considerations. Justifying the existence of government trans-
fers as an optimal outcome would require some form of heterogeneity across households. This
is beyond the scope of the paper.
6As in SGU (2004a), ln gt, gt = Gt=Pt, is assumed to evolve exogenously following an inde-
pendent AR(1) process. We assume instead that the level of the real transfer non stochastic.
7These are obtained implementing SGU (2004b) 2nd order appoximation routines.
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parameter  is set so that in the exible-price steady-state households allocate
20 percent of their time to work.
Table 2 Baseline calibration8
 = 0:96 p = 1:20 w = 1:00
A = 0:011 p = 4:37 w = 0:00
B = 0:075 p = 0:00 w = 0:00
In Figure 1 we describe the optimal ination response to the transfer increase
and to a corresponding variation in public consumption. Simulations show that
ination rapidly increases when T=Y grows beyond the 8% threshold. For in-
stance, the optimal ination rate is close to 3% when T=Y is 10%, and exceeds
13% when the transfer ratio is 20%. Simulations also show that in the case
where public expenditure is conned to public consumption, optimal ination
would exceed 0:5% only for ratio G=Y larger than 35%.
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Figure 1 Public expenditure and optimal ination
One key mechanism driving the choice of the optimal policy mix is related to
the distortionary taxation necessary to nance the additional transfers, which
adversely a¤ects the labour supply and reduces the tax base. By contrast, the
8 In all the paper the AR(1) processes driving the government spending and the technology
shock are calibrated as in SGU (2004a), The serial correlation of ln gt is set at 0:9 and the
standard deviation of innovation to ln gt is 0.0302; the serial correlation of ln zt is 0:82 and
the standard deviation of innovation is 0:0229.
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increase in public consumption generates a negative wealth e¤ect that triggers
a positive labour supply response and expands the tax base. In this case the
incentive to increase ination is much reduced.
Formally, the optimal policy mix is determined by the di¤erent e¤ects of t;
 t on the policy wedge 
t =
1+s(vt)+vts
0(vt)
1 t in
Wt
Pt
= w
t
ul (Ct; lt)
uc (Ct; lt)


0
t ( t), 

0
t (t) > 0, but 

00
t ( t) > 0, 

00
t (t) = 0. This explains why the
Ramsey planner increasingly relies on the ination tax as public expenditures
grow. In Figure 2 we compare the optimal steady state value of 
 with the
value that would obtain if ination were constrained at zero.
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Figure 2 Public transfers and the policy wedge
It is interesting to compare our interpretation of the inationary outcome
generated by the need to nance transfers with the one o¤ered by SGU (2006:
385). In fact, they claimed that when the private sector must receive an ex-
ogenous amount of (after-tax) transfers, it is optimal to exploit the ination
tax on money balances in order to impose an indirect levy on the (transfers-
determined) source of household income. In our view this claim is not correct.
In fact, scal considerations would not matter for the optimal ination rate if
lump-sum taxes were available. The incentive to choose a positive ination rate
arises because taxes are distortionary and, as shown above, nancing transfers
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is profoundly di¤erent from nancing an equivalent amount of public consump-
tion. Thus the Ramsey planner chooses a positive ination rate in order to limit
output distortions and to increase output and consumption. In Figure 3 below
we show the consumption responses to di¤erent transfer ratios when ination
is zero and when it is chosen optimally. Our interpretation of the reason why
a su¢ ciently large amount of transfers calls for a positive ination di¤ers from
the one presented in SGU (2006: 397), and is a novel contribution of the paper.
0 5 10 15 20
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
government transfers on output (%)
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
zero inflation
optimal policy
Figure 3 Public transfers, policy wedges and consumption
Recent studies suggest that rms adjust prices more frequently than pre-
viously thought. For instance Eichenbaum and Fischer (2007) infer that rms
re-optimize prices once every 2:33 quarters, but cannot reject the hypothesis
that rms reoptimize prices once every two quarters. In the gure below we con-
sider the e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of stickiness (measure as average duration
of price-setting decisions) assuming that T=Y = 10%. The optimal ination
rate depends on the rmsaverage adjustment to rest price, and substantially
increase when average duration is between 2 and 3 quarters.
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Figure 5 Price adjustment and trend ination
Finally, the optimal policy mix depends on monopolistic distortions. For
instance, when p = 1:1 optimal ination remains very close to zero for T=Y
12
 15% (Figure 4).
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Figure 4 Public transfers, market distortions and optimal
ination
4.2 Wage stickiness.
Introducing wage stickiness has two opposite e¤ects on the optimal ination
rate. On the one hand, monopolistic distortions raise the incentive to substitute
labor taxation with the ination tax. On the other hand, nominal wage adjust-
ment costs strengthen the case for price stability. After setting w = 1:2,9 we
postulate that price and wage adjustment costs are identical (w = p = 4:37).
Simulations show that for T=Y < 10% the two e¤ects o¤set each other (Figure
5). Beyond that threshold the wage adjustment cost dominates and the optimal
9Our choice of the wage markup follows Erceg et al. (2006), and is close to the value
reported in Galí et al. (2007), but is lower than the calibration in Erceg et al. (2000). It
should be noted, however, that Christiano et al. (2005, 2010) choose values much closer to
one. We will consider a di¤erent calibration later.
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ination rate falls relative to the perfect competition case.
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Figure 5 Optimal ination: Flexible vs. sticky wages
4.3 Indexation
Ination costs associated with nominal rigidities depend crucially on assump-
tions about the prices set by rms that cannot reoptimize. A commonly studied
indexation scheme is one whereby non-reoptimized prices increase mechanically
at a rate proportional to the economy-wide lagged rate of ination (Christiano
et al., 2005). In many estimated DSGE models it is assumed that the price and
wage are indexed to a weighted average of past and trend ination, in order to
obtain a vertical long-run Phillips curve (see for instance Smets and Wouters,
2005, 2007). Recent contributions provide conicting evidence on the extent of
price indexation.10 In Figure 6 we assume an identical degree of wage and price
10Cogley and Sbordone (2008) estimate a New Keynesian Phillips Curve, nding that price
indexation in the U.S. is zero once a time-varying ination trend is accounted for. By contrast,
Barnes et al. (2009) show that this result is not robust to the introduction of more exible
indexation schemes. Aruoba and Schorfheide (2009) nd that 15% of rms optimize in each
period, 60% of rms fully index their price to past ination, the remaining rms hold their price
constant. Microdata analyses suggest that indexation parameters are lower for consumption
prices than for nominal wages (Du Caju et al. 2008; Mac´kowiak and Smets, 2008). In line with
this result, Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2008) nd that  = 0:15; w = 0:85.
14
indexation (p = w) ranging between 0 and 40%.11 When T=Y > 10% even
a moderate degree of indexation (20%) has a non negligible impact on optimal
ination.
0 4 8 12 16 20
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
government transfer on output (%)
in
fla
tio
n 
(%
)
no indexation
20%  indexation
40%  indexation
Figure 6 Public transfers, indexation and optimal ination
5 Extensions: Consumption scale e¤ects in the
monetary transactions technology.
The transaction cost specication adopted in (3) constrains the consumption
elasticity of money demand to be one, in contrast with a large body of empirical
literature.12 Theoretical models accounting for consumption scale e¤ects include
Baumol (1952) and Khan et al. (2003). Attanasio et al. (2002) nd substantial
economies of scale in cash management using microdata. In a di¤erent model,
Guidotti and Vegh (1993) show that the constant elasticity of scale is an unduly
restrictive assumption and that it is optimal to resort to the ination tax if
the transaction costs technology does not exhibit constant returns to scale. We
therefore propose a denition of St;i which accounts for such scale e¤ects.
St;i = s(vt;i)g(Ct;i) ; g(Ct;i) > 0; g
0(Ct;i) < 0 (19)
11 Introducing asymmetries in the degrees of price and wage indexation would not a¤ect our
conclusions (simulations results available upon request).
12See Choi and Oh (2003), Dib (2004), Knell and Stix (2005) and references therein. Chris-
tiano et al. (2005) obtain an estimate of 0:1.
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where St;i still vanishes at v and g0(Ct;i) < 013 allows to obtain that unit
transaction costs are decreasing in consumption. We assume the following spec-
ication for the monetary transaction cost14
g(Ct;i) = C
 
t;i   0 (20)
Note that for  = 0 scale e¤ects in consumption expenditure vanish and (19)
converges to (4)
The resulting money demand function
Mt
Pt
=
Ctq
B
A + (Rt   1) C

t
A
(21)
is characterized by a consumption elasticity (m):
m =
@ (Mt=Pt)
@C
C
Mt=Pt
=

1  1
2
 (R  1)C
B + (R  1)C

 1 (22)
This apparently innocuous modication can have substantial implications for
our model. In fact condition (6) now becomes
t =
uc (Ct; lt)
1 + St + Ct
@St
@Ct
=
uc (Ct; lt)
1 + s
0(vt)vt+(1 )s(vt)
C
(23)
The transactions-induced wedge between the marginal utility of consumption
and the marginal utility of wealth unambiguously falls in  for any level of money
velocity. Our conjecture is that this should support an increase in the optimal
ination rate. To grasp intuition observe that in (14) the policy wedge 
t now
falls in  (as St;i accounts for scale e¤ects of transaction costs technology). This,
in turn, implies that the adverse e¤ect of ination on the desired real wage is
reduced.
We compare three di¤erent scenarios. In scenario 1 we represent an economy
calibrated as in SGU (2004a), where parameters are calibrated as in Table 2
with G=Y = 0:2, T=Y = 0. In scenario 2 instead we assume sticky wages
(with p = 1:2 and w = 4:37), 20% indexation on both prices and wages,
public consumption set at 20% and a transfer equal to 11% of output. In
scenario 3 we assume that prices are relatively exible and the degree of price
indexation to past ination is modest, whereas wages are characterized by strong
indexation, as found in Galí and Rabanal (2005), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez
(2005), Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2008) and Christiano et al.
(2010). Relative to scenario 2, we set p = 2:5 (i.e., price are reset about every
six months on average), p = 0:15 and w = 0:85.15
13We also assume that g(C) is twice continuously di¤erentiable.
14When  = 0 scale e¤ects in consumption expenditure vanish and (19) converges to the
transaction technology specied in SGU (2004a).
15 Indexation parameters are taken from Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2008).
See below.
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Table 3 Consumption scale e¤ects
scenario 1 scenario 2 scenario 3
  m  m  m
0.0 -0.15 1.000 4.43 1.000 7.87 1.000
0.4 0.00 0.959 4.63 0.962 8.26 0.962
0.8 0.12 0.956 4.80 0.963 8.55 0.963
1.2 0.19 0.967 4.92 0.974 8.95 0.974
1.6 0.23 0.978 4.98 0.984 9.13 0.984
2.0 0.25 0.987 5.00 0.991 9.22 0.991
Our simulations (Table 3) conrm that optimal trend ination is increasing
in . The strongest impact on ination is obtained in scenario 3, when price
and nominal wage adjustment costs are relatively milder. In steady state equi-
librium consumption scale e¤ects have a limited, reversed hump-shaped e¤ect
on consumption elasticity of money demand, which reaches a minimum value
for about  = 0:6.
6 Calibration for the US economy.
In this section we calibrate the model to the US economy. Our purpose is to
benchmark the optimal ination rate against Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramirez (2008) estimates of the time-varying ination target implicitly adopted
by the Federal Reserve over the period 1957-2000 and over the high ination
sub-sample 1973-1991.16 The ratios G=Y and T=Y are derived from the US
NIPA data. During the period 1957-2000 the average government-consumption-
and transfers-to-GDP have been 20% and 9%, respectively. For the sub-sample
1973-1991 we nd similar gures for G=Y and a slightly higher transfers ratio,
about 10%.17 As before we assume that the subjective discount rate  is 0:96
and the transaction cost parameters A and B are 0:011 and 0:075. For the re-
maining parameters (, p, w, p, w, 
p, w) we consider 6 alternatives (Table
4). The rst calibration simply replicates the SGU (2004a) exercise augmented
by public transfers. Thus, we have perfect competition in the labor market and
no indexation. The second calibration di¤ers from the rst because we consider
consumption scale e¤ects in monetary transaction costs to the calibration. The
third calibration extends the second one by introducing in the labor market
monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities, which are identical to those
assumed for the goods market. In addition, we allow for a moderate degree of
price and wage indexation (25%). In calibration 4 the parameters describing
nominal rigidities (p, w) imply that prices re-optimized on average every 10
months and wages every 9 months as in Smets and Wouters (2007). In calibra-
tion 5 we consider the highest frequency of price adjustment we found in the
16On the relevance of ination time-varying targets for monetary policy see Taylor (1998),
Sargent (1999), Primiceri (2006), Cogley and Sbordone (2008).
17As shown above, beyond the 8% threshold even a modest increase in T=Y may have a
strong impact the optimal ination rate.
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literature, 2 quarters, as reported in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2007).18
Table 4 The US economy calibration
Fixed parameters Alternative calibrations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 = 0:96  0 2 2 2 2
A = 0:011 p 4.37 4.37 4.37 7 2.47
B = 0:075 w 0 0 4.37 9.5 4.37
p 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25
w 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25
p 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
w 1 1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Simulations show that for all calibrations the optimal ination rate is positive
and increasing in the sub-sample 1973-1991 (Table 5). In this regard, it is
interesting to note that the optimal ination rate is highly sensitive to the
small change in T=Y observed over the two samples. A comparison between
calibrations 1 and 2 highlights the role of consumption scale e¤ects in monetary
transaction costs. Di¤erences in the price optimization inertia obviously explain
di¤erences in the optimal ination rate. Simulation 3 and 5 seem to provide
the best approximations to the estimated targets. In all cases the increase in
the public-transfers-to-GDP ratio observed during the high ination sub-sample
1973-1991 causes an increase in the optimal ination rate which accounts for a
large part of the estimated increase in the Fed target in that period.
Table 5 Optimal, observed and targeted ination19
US economy scenario
observed* est. target (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) whole sample 4.4 3.2 1.4 2.7 3.4 2.0 4.0
(2) high inf. period (73-91) 6.4 5.6 2.9 3.9 4.3 2.7 5.2
(*) CPI ination, excluding food and energy.
18 In calibrations 4 and 5 we maintain a 25% degree of price and wage indexation because
both Smets and Wouters (2007) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) assume full indexation
in steady state, thus obtaining a long run vertical Phillips curve. Fernandez-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramirez (2008) obtain estimates for p, w, p, w starting from at priors. We do not
consider here their reported values because the variant of Calvo pricing they consider imposes
a constant elasticity of substitution across goods over the business cycle and overestimates the
degree of price inertia. For a criticism of their approach, see Kimball (1995) and Eichenbaum
and Evans (2007).
19The estimated targets are computed from Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2008). They report the targets for the whole period 3:2% and discuss that the target was
1:6% in the period between 1950-72 and in the 90. From these information one can derive
the target for the high-ination period (1973-91). See also Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in their paper.
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7 Optimal monetary and scal stabilization poli-
cies
In this section we investigate whether our characterization of steady-state public
expenditures also bears implications for the conduct of macroeconomic policies
over the business cycle. SGU (2004a) show that costly price adjustment induces
the Ramsey planner to choose a minimal amount of ination volatility and to
select a permanent public debt response to shocks in order to smooth taxes over
the business cycle. We compare the SGU (2004a) exercise where (T=Y = 0,
G=Y = 0:2) with an alternative characterization of the steady state, where
(T=Y = 0:1, G=Y = 0:2).20 In Table 6 we show that when T=Y = 0:1 the
volatility of both taxes and ination dramatically increases whereas the strong
persistence of taxes vanishes. To grasp intuition consider the impulse response
functions to a 3% (one standard deviation) increase in government purchases
(Figure 7). To sharpen the analysis we assume the shock is serially uncorre-
lated. Under both scenarios the permanent debt adjustment allows to smooth
tax distortions. However, the di¤erent magnitudes of the permanent debt and
tax adjustments associated to the two cases (T=Y = 0 and T=Y = 0:1) are also
evident. When T=Y = 0:1, the long-run debt adjustment is reduced by 75%. In
this case long-run tax distortions are already relatively large, and the accumu-
lation of debt in the face of an adverse shock becomes less desirable. Instead,
the planner nds it optimal to front-load tax adjustment and to inate away
part of the real value of outstanding nominal debt. This explains the surge in
ination volatility reported in Table 6.
Table 621Dynamic properties of the Ramsey allocation (2nd or. approx.)
mean st. dev. auto. corr. corr(x,y) corr(x,g) corr(x,z)
T=Y = 0, G=Y = 0:2
 25.19 1.062 0.759 -0.305 0.436 -0.236
 -0.16 0.177 0.034 -0.108 0.374 -0.275
R 3.82 0.566 0.863 -0.942 -0.044 -0.962
y 0.21 0.007 0.820 1.000 0.204 0.938
h 0.21 0.003 0.823 -0.085 0.590 -0.402
c 0.17 0.007 0.824 0.940 -0.123 0.954
T=Y = 0:1, G=Y = 0:2
 42.69 2.860 -0.053 -0.110 0.284 -0.356
 1.46 0.962 -0.054 -0.062 0.304 -0.309
R 5.50 0.489 0.775 -0.790 0.142 -0.926
y 0.17 0.005 0.823 1.000 0.408 0.884
h 0.17 0.003 0.714 -0.237 0.699 -0.651
c 0.13 0.005 0.783 0.851 -0.091 0.985
20We consider a productivity and a public consumption shocks. Parameter calibrations and
properties of stochastic processes are described in Table 2. We compute the second-order
approximation using SGU (2004b) routines (See also SGU 2004a: Section 7).
21 In the table,  , , R, y, h and c stand for the tax rate, ination rate, nominal interest
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Figure 7 Fiscal shock IRF
8 Conclusions.
Since Phelps we know that a positive ination rate might mitigate the distor-
tions induced by the need to nance government budgets. In contrast with
previous research, we show that this argument is relevant given the policy mix
between government consumption and transfers that we observe in OECD coun-
tries. This result holds for plausible parameterizations of price and nominal wage
adjustment costs. In addtion, the size of monopolistic distortions, the degree
of price and wage indexation, the consumption scale e¤ect in monetary trans-
action costs unambiguously increase the optimal ination rate. Unfortunately,
empirical evidence on these latter variables is rather limited. In fact estimated
DSGE models typically impose markup parameters, assume a vertical long-run
Phillips curve and neglect monetary transaction costs.
Our calibrations show that the prediction of a positive ination rate holds for
the US, where the government size is relatively small. A fortiori, our reconsider-
rate, output, hours and consumption, respectively.
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ation of the Phelps conjecture appears even more appropriate when considering
countries in the Euro area where the welfare state plays a more important role.
In contrast with SGU (2010), who argue that central bank ination targets
are too high, our contribution shows that a 2% target might be too low, at
least for countries where the burden of taxation is rather high, such as those
of continental Europe. The explanation for this might be that commitment to
a low ination rate is used to discipline spending decisions, which we assume
to be exogenous in our model. In fact several political economy models point
out that distorted policymakers incentives inate public expenditures.22 As
shown in Acemoglu et al. (2009), the Ramsey-optimal taxation is substantially
a¤ected when taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested
politician who cannot commit to policies. In a similar vein, further research
should investigate how these two frictions, i.e. politiciansself-interest and lack
of commitment, may a¤ect the choice of the optimal ination target.
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